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District Judge: The Honorable Mary Little Cooper 
______________________ 
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__________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge.  
A little over two years into the civil-rights suit brought 
by Joan Mullin (“Mullin”) over the tragic prison suicide of 
her son, Robert Mullin (“Robert”), Mullin’s attorney received 
a discovery document with the potential to reshape the case.  
A previously undisclosed investigative report about the night 
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Robert died contained statements by fellow New Jersey 
inmates about a prison guard who allegedly refused Robert’s 
requests for psychiatric assistance—and urged Robert to kill 
himself instead.  But while Mullin’s attorney received this 
report mid-case, it was not reviewed in a timely fashion.  
Instead, due to a clerical error, the disc containing the 
relevant disclosures was misfiled, and not fully accessed until 
about ten months later.  By that time, Mullin’s operative 
complaint—premised on a less direct knew-or-should-have-
known theory of Robert’s vulnerability to suicide—had 
already been dismissed in large part.  The District Court 
denied Mullin’s request for leave to amend her complaint, 
due in part to the delay caused by counsel’s error and, after 
additional motion practice, granted summary judgment in 
favor of the one remaining defendant, bringing the litigation 
to a close.    
Mullin’s appeal encompasses both the dismissal of her 
operative complaint and the order denying further leave to 
amend.  The latter is the focus of this opinion.  For the 
reasons set forth below, we conclude that the decision 
denying leave to amend amounted to an impermissible 
exercise of discretion.  Some of the factors relied upon to 
deny leave are not supported by the record or are at odds with 
our case law.  And while we do not intend to minimize 
counsel’s mistake, it does not, standing alone, support 
denying leave to amend.  Accordingly, we will vacate the 
order denying leave to amend and will remand for further 
proceedings.   
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I. BACKGROUND1 
A. Robert’s Death and Mullin’s Initial 
Investigation 
 
During the early morning hours of January 17, 2009, 
New Jersey prisoner Robert Mullin hanged himself with a 
bedsheet that he had fashioned into a noose.  The twenty-
nine-year-old Robert had been in and out of prison for the 
better part of a decade, in part due to his ongoing struggles 
with substance abuse.  While serving out his latest sentence at 
a halfway house, Robert was found in possession of 
contraband.  As a result, he was transferred to New Jersey’s 
Central Reception & Assignment Facility (“Assignment 
Facility”), where he was assessed and assigned to an area of 
the facility that did not feature extensive or individualized 
supervision by staff.  It was there, in his Assignment Facility 
cell, that he took his own life—less than a day after entering 
the Facility. 
In the aftermath, Robert’s mother, Joan Mullin, sought 
answers.  What few were given, however, were incomplete 
and at times inaccurate.  In one instance, she was told that her 
son had died at a completely different facility, the Trenton 
Psychiatric Hospital—an error repeated on his death 
certificate.  Despite some slow progress, she continued to lack 
key information about the final days and hours of Robert’s 
life and the people and entities to whom his care was 
entrusted. 
                                              
1 The litigation has been unusually confusing, complex, 
and—to be frank—frustrating, due in part to the swirling gyre 
of overlapping motions practice. We simplify when practical. 
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B. Mullin Files the Original Complaint in 
January 2011 
 
Despite this state of affairs, Mullin filed suit in the 
District of New Jersey shortly before the two-year mark of 
Robert’s death,2 raising state tort claims and constitutional 
vulnerability-to-suicide claims (the latter of which is a 
variation on a constitutional claim alleging deliberate 
indifference to a serious medical need).  The complaint 
focused on the defendants’ alleged failure to provide Robert 
with the level of care, treatment, and monitoring that he 
needed, and that was required by prison policy for someone 
with his history of depression, self-harm, and substance 
abuse.  Mullin alleged that Robert was placed in a cell that 
was inadequately supervised and altogether inappropriate for 
a person with a history of suicide attempts—a decision made 
all the more inexcusable by the medical history and recent 
relapse into drug addiction that his custodians failed to 
properly review or otherwise heed.   
Mullin named a variety of defendants, several of 
whom were employed by the State of New Jersey and 
represented by the New Jersey Attorney General’s office. We 
will refer to these as the “State Defendants.”   
C. Mullin Twice Amends Her Complaint 
Mullin twice amended her complaint to both flesh out 
the facts—in part to account for interim discovery she 
                                              
2 Although Mullin sued both in her individual capacity and as 
the administratrix of Robert’s estate, a dual role reflected in 
our caption, the claims now on appeal are those brought in 
her representative capacity on behalf of Robert’s estate.  
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received from non-State defendants—and to modify the list of 
defendants.  In particular, Mullin sought to add Officer 
Nicholas Dimler, the Assignment Facility guard who, 
according to the medical examiner’s report, was the last 
person (who wasn’t a fellow inmate) to see Robert alive—and 
the one who later discovered his body.   
Mullin’s first attempt to amend, filed in response to the 
defendants’ initial Rule 12 motions, was granted in part and 
denied in part.  Among other things, the Magistrate Judge 
determined that the proposed amended complaint lacked 
sufficient detail of Dimler’s involvement in Robert’s death 
and did not state a plausible claim for relief against him.  
Under these constraints, Mullin filed her first amended 
complaint (“FAC”) in December 2011.  
After obtaining additional discovery, Mullin again 
asked to amend in July 2012, arguing in part that she could 
now plead a viable claim against Officer Dimler.  Mullin 
alleged essentially that Officer Dimler knew or should have 
known of Robert’s history of suicide and psychiatric illness; 
that Dimler failed to review records that would have alerted 
him to Robert’s condition; and that Dimler failed to follow 
prison policies and reasonable practices pertaining to inmates 
with Robert’s vulnerabilities.  This time, the Magistrate Judge 
allowed Mullin’s amendment to include the revised 
allegations against Officer Dimler, finding them to be 
“plausible” instead of merely possible.3  Mullin’s Second 
Amended Complaint (“SAC”), the operative complaint for 
the remainder of the litigation in the District Court, was then 
filed in September 2012.  The SAC, like its predecessors, was 
met with Rule 12 motions to dismiss. 
                                              
3 Order at 7, ECF No. 101.   
7 
 
D. While the Motions to Dismiss are Pending, 
Mullin Receives New Evidence in Discovery 
 
Although Mullin had obtained some discovery by the 
time the SAC was filed—almost two years into the 
litigation—she had received no disclosures from the State 
Defendants and, by extension, from the Department of 
Corrections or the State itself. The State Defendants finally 
made two separate document disclosures, pursuant to an 
amended pretrial scheduling order, while their motion to 
dismiss was pending.  Both sets bear on Mullin’s later attempt 
at amendment, although for very different reasons.  
One set of disclosures, from July 2013 (the “July 2013 
disclosures”), contained information on various prison 
policies regarding suicide watch, close custody, and screening 
procedures employed by the Assignment Facility. For 
instance, Mullin received a policy manual on “Special Needs 
Inmates,” covering inmates who suffer from certain 
psychiatric disorders and are “unable to meet the functional 
requirements of incarceration without mental health 
treatment.”4 It appears that the July 2013 disclosures did not 
pertain to Robert individually or contain information relating 
to the night he died.  
More important was a set of disclosures from April 
2013 (the “April 2013 disclosures”) that, by contrast, 
contained information directly relevant to Robert and his 
history in the prison system.  Among the new revelations 
were statements from fellow inmates about a prison guard 
                                              
4 JA 1015. 
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who allegedly ignored Robert’s requests for mental health 
services and, instead, told him to commit suicide.   
These statements were contained in a February 2009 
Department of Corrections Administrative Investigation 
Report (“the Report”).  According to the Report, a previously 
unknown guard, Officer X,5 interacted with Robert over his 
only evening at the facility, and may have been the last 
person (instead of Officer Dimler) to see Robert alive. The 
details of Officer X’s interaction with Robert, as related in the 
Report, were very disturbing. Six inmates, who had been 
interviewed about Robert hours after his suicide—close in 
time to the incident, and potentially before having any 
opportunity to get their stories straight—volunteered that they 
had heard Robert ask Officer X to see “psych,” and that 
Officer X had refused Robert’s request and taken no action. 
Three of the inmates went further: Officer X not only refused 
assistance, but egged Robert on, telling him that he “might as 
well kill [him]self.”6 The Report therefore suggested Officer 
X’s actual awareness of, and indifference to, Robert’s 
condition.  The Report elsewhere revealed that Robert was in 
fact classified as a “special needs” inmate requiring enhanced 
levels of care.7 Thus, although Officer X, interviewed later, 
flatly denied both parts of this account, the Report had the 
potential to reframe and support Mullin’s case.   
                                              
5 Because the guard is not currently a party and might not 
become one, his name is redacted in this opinion.   
6 JA 986. 
7 JA 989. 
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E. Counsel’s Error: The April 2013 Discovery is 
Misplaced 
 
But this potential would go untapped—at least for the 
time being—because Mullin did not initially know that it had 
been received. The April 2013 material was subdivided and 
Bates stamped as “DOC MULLIN 0001–392” and 
“CONFIDENTIAL MULLIN 0001–305.”8 Due to a clerical 
error, Mullin’s attorney failed to review the 
CONFIDENTIAL MULLIN material that contained the 
Report and other relevant documents. The disclosures had 
been provided by the State Defendants on two optical discs, 
one for the MULLIN material and the other for the 
CONFIDENTIAL MULLIN material. The attorney asked her 
staff to print out both discs for review, but one disc was 
printed twice and the other was misfiled in the folder of an 
unrelated matter. And because Mullin’s attorney was not 
aware of the new material, she did not move to further amend 
her complaint, even though an earlier scheduling order had 
suggested that further amendment for truly “new” discoveries 
might be allowed.  
F. The District Court Dismisses the SAC  
With Mullin unaware of the new discovery, the SAC—
whose allegations were premised on the theory that the 
defendants should have known, based on Robert’s answers to 
intake questions and his transfer/medical records, that he was 
particularly vulnerable to suicide—remained the operative 
complaint.  Thus, unlike prior motions to dismiss, which had 
been interrupted by Mullin’s requests to amend, these Rule 12 
                                              
8 JA 1098. 
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motions were resolved on the merits, with the District Judge 
directly addressing Mullin’s claims for the first time.  In a 
November 2013 decision, the District Court granted the State 
Defendants’ motion to dismiss in its entirety, although the 
Court allowed Mullin’s claims against the Assignment 
Facility intake nurse to proceed to summary judgment and, 
thus, the case remained ongoing.9   
G. Realizing the Mistake, Counsel Moves to 
Amend 
 
Despite indications that something was missing, 
Mullin’s attorney only realized her mistake in February 
2014—ten months after the April 2013 disclosures, and three 
months after the District Court had dismissed the SAC in 
large part—during a conversation with attorneys for non-state 
defendants who were privy to the CONFIDENTIAL 
MULLIN material.  In the flurry of activity that followed, 
Mullin’s attorney advised the District Court of her mistake 
and, after being told by the court to delay formally moving to 
amend until a pending reconsideration motion was resolved.  
Mullin moved in August 2014 to amend her complaint to 
include information from the April and July 2013 disclosures. 
In addition to repleading claims against Dimler and other 
previously dismissed defendants, Mullin’s proposed Third 
Amended Complaint (“TAC”) incorporated the material from 
                                              
9 See Mullin v. Balicki, No. 11-247, 2013 WL 5935998, at *6 
(D.N.J. Nov. 1, 2013). The halfway house itself, which had 
been named as a defendant but did not file a Rule 12 motion, 
also remained in the case through November 2015, when it 
entered into a stipulation of dismissal. 
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the April and July 2013 disclosures and added Officer X, a 
fellow guard, and four supervisors as defendants.  
H. Leave to Amend is Denied 
The presiding Magistrate Judge denied leave to amend, 
finding that Mullin’s delay was undue and that the defendants 
would suffer prejudice if amendment were allowed. The 
Judge also suggested in passing that claims against new 
parties would not “relate back” for limitations purposes under 
Rule 15(c). The Magistrate Judge did not directly address the 
futility of the proposed amendment, which had not been 
raised by the State Defendants. After Mullin objected to the 
Magistrate Judge’s order, the District Court affirmed it in a 
short decision.10  Mullin timely appealed. 
                                              
10 See JA 80–85, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90384. 
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II. DISCUSSION11 
                                              
11 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Mullin’s 
appeal challenges the dismissal of the SAC (per Officer 
Dimler only) and the subsequent denial of reconsideration, in 
addition to the order denying further leave to amend.  The last 
of these, which was the only topic addressed at oral argument, 
is discussed at length above the margin; the first two are 
summarily resolved in this note.  
With regard to the order dismissing the SAC, we have 
reviewed the District Court’s dismissal decision against the 
backdrop of Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209 (3d Cir. 2017), 
which clarified our vulnerability-to-suicide precedent but was 
decided after the District Court issued its opinion in this case.  
Having the benefit of the parties’ supplemental briefing, we 
are satisfied that the District Court correctly dismissed the 
constitutional and state-tort claims against Officer Dimler for 
substantially the reasons set forth in that Court’s opinion.  We 
particularly agree that, when pleading a vulnerability-to-
suicide claim, an allegation that a defendant “knew or should 
have known” of a prisoner’s vulnerability is a conclusory 
recitation of the knowledge element of the underlying cause 
of action, and cannot meet the plaintiff’s pleading burden 
without additional facts showing (or allowing the reasonable 
inference of) knowledge or the responsibility to know.  See 
Franklin v. Curry, 738 F.3d 1246, 1251 (11th Cir. 2013) (per 
curiam).  
 
In light of our leave-to-amend disposition, we need not reach 
the order denying reconsideration, which was premised 
largely on the new discovery evidence probative of the 
13 
 
A. Rule 15 and Standard of Review 
Leave to amend is governed by Rule 15, “Amended 
and Supplemental Pleadings,” which generally conditions 
amendment on the court’s leave or the opposing party’s 
written consent.12  Lacking a time limit or an outer bound on 
when amendment is permissible, the Rule instructs courts to 
“freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.”13 
This liberal amendment regime helps effectuate the “general 
policy embodied in the Federal Rules favoring resolution of 
cases on their merits.”14   
In determining whether leave to amend might 
reasonably be denied, courts are guided by the Foman factors, 
named for the Supreme Court’s decision in Foman v. Davis, 
371 U.S. 178 (1962).  Denial of leave to amend can be based 
on undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the 
movant; repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments 
previously allowed; prejudice to the opposing party; and 
futility.15 The Foman factors are not exhaustive, allowing a 
court to ground its decision, within reason, on consideration 
                                                                                                     
request for amendment.  Accordingly, both the order 
dismissing the SAC and the order denying reconsideration 
will be affirmed. 
12 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). 
13 Id. 
14 Island Creek Coal Co. v. Lake Shore, Inc., 832 F.2d 274, 
279 (4th Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
15 Foman, 371 U.S at 182; see also United States ex rel. 
Schumann v. AstraZeneca Pharm. L.P., 769 F.3d 837, 849 
(3d Cir. 2014).   
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of additional equities, such as judicial economy/burden on the 
court16 and the prejudice denying leave to amend would cause 
to the plaintiff.17 All factors are not created equal, however, 
                                              
16 See USX Corp. v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 161, 167–68 (3d Cir. 
2004). 
17 See Bell v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 160 F.3d 452, 454 (8th 
Cir. 1998). 
As they did before the District Court, the State Defendants 
suggest that the liberal amendment standard should not apply 
with its ordinary force because Mullin did not seek leave until 
after “judgment” had been entered—meaning, in this case, the 
order granting the pending motions to dismiss in large part. 
State Defs. Br. 26. They refer to a line of cases in which we 
explained that “[w]hen a party seeks leave to amend a 
complaint after judgment has been entered, it must also move 
to set aside the judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 59(e) or 60(b), because the complaint cannot be 
amended while the judgment stands.” Jang v. Boston Sci. 
Scimed, Inc., 729 F.3d 357, 367–68 (3d Cir. 2013); see also 
Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 207–08 (3d Cir. 2002). 
The “judgment” in that line of cases, however, meant a final 
or appealable order. See Cureton v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic 
Ass’n, 252 F.3d 267, 272–73 (3d Cir. 2001). But here, 
judgment had not been entered at the time Mullin moved to 
amend, as the case was still ongoing against the intake nurse 
and the District Court had not otherwise solemnized its Rule 
12 decision into a judgment by using Rule 54(b). Jang, 
Cureton, Ahmed, and other decisions in this line are thus 
distinguishable from this case, and no formal post-judgment 
standard applies (although these concerns can of course still 
be considered).   
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as “prejudice to the non-moving party is the touchstone for 
the denial of an amendment.”18  
A decision on whether to permit amendment of the 
pleadings generally falls within the District Court’s 
discretion. It follows that we review for abuse of that 
discretion, except where amendment is denied for legal 
reasons drawing de novo review (such as when the proposed 
amendment would fail to state a claim).19 If we find an error 
in the District Court’s reasoning, we exercise our own 
discretion in determining whether we will nevertheless affirm 
“if . . . the District Court’s [remaining] findings would 
support denial of leave to amend.”20  
While abuse of discretion is ordinarily a deferential 
standard of review, it has bite in this context; the District 
Court’s discretion, circumscribed by the Rule 15’s directive 
in favor of amendment, must be “exercised within the context 
of liberal pleading rules.”21 Moreover, leave to amend is not 
an all-or-nothing proposition. Relying on the Foman factors, 
courts can choose instead to impose reasonable conditions on 
the right to amend in lieu of a pure grant or denial. 
                                              
18 Arthur v. Maersk, Inc., 434 F.3d 196, 204 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
19 See Schumann, 769 F.3d at 849. 
20 Maersk, 434 F.3d at 204. 
21 Berkshire Fashions, Inc. v. The M.V. Hakusan II, 954 F.2d 
874, 886 (3d Cir. 1992); see also Martin’s Herend Imports, 
Inc. v. Diamond & Gem Trading United States of Am. Co., 
195 F.3d 765, 770 (5th Cir. 1999) (explaining that 
“discretion” is misleading because of the “bias in favor of 
granting leave to amend” (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted)). 
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Specifically, a court “may use its discretion to impose 
conditions on the allowance of a proposed amendment as an 
appropriate means of balancing the interests of the party 
seeking the amendment and those of the party objecting to it,” 
such as by “narrow[ing] the scope of the amendment if it 
considers the request too broad.”22  
One additional background consideration applies in 
civil rights cases like this one. In our Circuit, “district courts 
must offer amendment [in civil rights cases]—irrespective of 
whether it is requested—when dismissing a case for failure to 
state a claim unless doing so would be inequitable or futile.”23 
By contrast, plaintiffs in “ordinary” civil litigation—
commercial disputes, for instance—must take affirmative 
steps to obtain amendment in the face of dismissal.24   
B. Analysis 
Although the District Court gave reasons of its own 
when declining to set aside the Magistrate Judge’s order, we 
are really reviewing the Magistrate Judge’s exercise of 
discretion in entering the order, and not the District Court’s 
deferential review of the same. Accordingly, we will focus 
                                              
22 Wright & Miller § 1486; see also Garfield v. NDC Health 
Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1271 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he granting 
of leave to amend can be conditioned in order to avoid 
prejudice to the opposing party.” (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted)). 
23 Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 
482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007); see also Estate of Lagano 
v. Bergen Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 769 F.3d 850, 861 (3d 
Cir. 2014).   
24 See Fletcher-Harlee, 482 F.3d at 252–53. 
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our review on the Magistrate Judge’s analysis of the Foman 
factors.    
1. Undue Delay 
The “undue delay” factor recognizes that a gap 
between when amendment becomes possible and when it is 
actually sought can, in certain circumstances, be grounds to 
deny leave to amend. While simple delay cannot justify 
denying leave to amend by itself, delay that is “undue”—a 
delay that is protracted and unjustified—can place a burden 
on the court or counterparty, or can indicate a lack of 
diligence sufficient to justify a discretionary denial of leave.25 
As there is “no presumptive period in which . . . delay 
becomes ‘undue,’”26 the “question of undue delay requires 
that we focus on the movant’s reasons for not amending 
sooner” while “bearing in mind the liberal pleading 
philosophy of the federal rules.”27 “Following this principle, 
we have refused to overturn denials of motions for leave to 
                                              
25 See Bjorgung v. Whitetail Resort, LP, 550 F.3d 263, 266 
(3d Cir. 2008); Cureton v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 
252 F.3d 267, 273 (3d Cir. 2001). 
26 Maersk, 434 F.3d at 205. In Maersk, we suggested that an 
eleven-month delay, as measured from “commencement of an 
action,” would not generally be “undue” by itself. See 
Maersk, 434 F.3d at 205. As discussed more fully below, 
there are two periods of delay here, the longer of which can 
be measured to run ten months.  Although neither period of 
delay would be presumptively undue if measured from the 
beginning of a lawsuit, the reasoning of Maersk may not 
apply with equal force to delays measured from a different 
point in an already long-running lawsuit. 
27 Cureton, 252 F.3d at 273.  
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amend where the moving party offered no cogent reason for 
the delay in seeking the amendment.”28  
The Magistrate Judge broke down the delay in this 
case into two discrete periods. First, the Judge assessed the 
delay arising from the July 2013 “policy” discovery, which 
Mullin’s counsel consciously chose not to use in an earlier 
amendment. Second, the Judge assessed the more-significant 
delay arising from the misplaced April 2013 discovery, which 
counsel was not aware of until February 2014. 
  i) July 2013 Discovery 
Mullin’s attorney argued that her reasons for declining 
to amend immediately upon receiving the July 2013 
discovery were reasonable, and that the delay before she first 
brought the material to the Court’s attention was thus not 
undue.29 She explained that she received the discovery after 
the return date for the motions to dismiss, assumed the period 
for requesting amendment was closed, and further assumed 
that the Court would not reopen the record.  Counsel also 
argued that amending was unnecessary. She believed that the 
SAC’s description of various policies and procedures was 
enough to survive the motions to dismiss, and that the 
meaning of the various policies of procedures would become 
clearer after she had received additional discovery.  
                                              
28 CMR D.N. Corp. v. City of Phila., 703 F.3d 612, 629 (3d 
Cir. 2013). 
29 We assume, as the Magistrate Judge appears to have 
decided, that the relevant delay is from July to November, 
which is when Mullin brought the July 2013 discovery to the 
Court’s attention via her motion for reconsideration  
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The Magistrate Judge found these reasons to be 
unconvincing, explaining that the closing-of-the-record point 
was “difficult to understand,” as “[Mullin] has not refrained 
from seeking leave from the Court for various reasons.”30 The 
Magistrate Judge also thought that counsel’s delay was 
impermissibly “tactical,” resulting in “waiting until the 
Motions to Dismiss were largely granted, and then asking for 
a ‘do-over.’”31 Deciding that this delay was not supported by 
a cogent reason, the Magistrate Judge deemed it “clearly 
undue.”32  
We disagree in part with the Magistrate Judge’s 
reasoning, and in particular with suggestion that counsel’s 
“tactical” decision transformed the delay into one that was 
undue. While we have disdained a wait-and-see approach to 
amendment, our major cases doing so fall in the post-
judgment posture discussed above.33 More recently, we have 
cautioned against overreading the scope of some of those 
earlier cases.34 Further, the decisions spurning a wait-and-see 
approach are “standard” civil disputes.35 This, by contrast, is 
                                              
30 JA 73. 
31 JA 74. 
32 JA 74. 
33 See supra note 17; see, e.g., Jang, 729 F.3d at 368; In re 
Adams Golf, Inc. Sec. Litig., 381 F.3d 267, 280 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(addressing unjustified two-and-a-half-year delay). 
34 See United States ex rel. Customs Fraud Investigations, 
LLC. v. Victaulic Co., 839 F.3d 242, 252 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(distinguishing, among other things, Jang and Adams). 
35 Jang is a contract case, see 729 F.3d at 359; Adams is a 
securities case, see 381 F.3d at 270; and California Public 
Employees’ Retirement System v. Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126 
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a civil rights case, with the attendant requirement in our case 
law that an opportunity to amend be presumed. In the 
ordinary course, a civil rights plaintiff would not expect a 
modest wait-and-see approach to constitute undue delay by 
itself—unless egregious or excessive, or if some other factor 
rendered the delay undue.  
Our normal civil rights rule is put to the test in this 
matter, however, given the sheer complexity of the 
proceedings, as well as the fact that Mullin was previously 
granted leave to amend.36 It is certainly reasonable to think 
that there may be some situations where a civil rights 
plaintiff’s pre-dismissal actions, or a court’s informal testing 
of the merits of the pleading, might count against granting 
amendment. But this case does not present such a situation. 
For one, although Mullin amended twice before, the second 
amendment (leading to the SAC) can be viewed as a 
perfection of the first, partially unsuccessful amendment.37 
For another, her pleadings had never actually been formally 
evaluated by the District Court, and “the mere fact that a 
defendant files a motion to dismiss is not necessarily 
                                                                                                     
(3d Cir. 2004), is a “securities class action lawsuit,” id. at 
134. 
36 See Customs Fraud, 839 F.3d at 252 (“In none of the cases 
the District Court relied upon did we uphold a dismissal with 
prejudice where the plaintiff had been given no opportunity to 
amend its complaint and would not be given an opportunity to 
amend in the future.” (emphasis added)). 
37 Cf. Bower v. Jones, 978 F.2d 1004, 1010 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(favoring amendment despite prior amendments when party 
acquired newly discovered documents and did not delay in 
seeking amendment). 
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sufficient to put a plaintiff on notice that the court will find 
his complaint to be deficient.”38  
Perhaps most important is that the SAC was informally 
tested on the merits before the motion to dismiss was 
resolved—and received a clean bill of health from the same 
Magistrate Judge, who opined that it passed muster under 
Twombly/Iqbal.39 The Magistrate Judge’s decision was, of 
course, not binding on the District Court, let alone on us. But 
it does suggest that Mullin’s “tactical” approach to the 
dismissal cannot be fairly called dilatory or contumacious, in 
light of the solicitude given in civil rights cases and the prior 
suggestion from the Magistrate Judge that the motion to 
dismiss would fail.  
  ii) April 2013 Discovery 
The April 2013 discovery—the disclosures containing 
the Report—presents a thornier problem. About ten months 
passed between the time the State Defendants sent Mullin’s 
attorney the April 2013 disclosures and the time the attorney 
realized that she had misplaced and failed to review them. 
Certainly, Mullin had a “reason” for not amending sooner: 
she was unaware of the evidence that she had been 
provided.40 The issue is whether this can suffice as a reason at 
all. We will, for the moment, disregard the issue of prejudice 
and instead look to whether, prejudice notwithstanding, the 
delay was “undue.” 
                                              
38 Customs Fraud, 839 F.3d at 249. 
39 Order at 7, ECF No. 101. 
40 See Langbord v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 832 F.3d 170, 188 
(3d Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1578 (2017). 
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In addressing counsel’s error, the Magistrate Judge 
focused on the “many opportunities plaintiff had to realize 
that the disc was missing and to follow up or at least make 
inquiry,” stating further that “no inquiry was made until 
counsel for defendants made Plaintiff’s counsel aware of the 
oversight during a conversation in February 2014.”41 Several 
“clues” should have alerted counsel to the missing discovery: 
(1) the initial April 2013 cover letter, which referred to the 
production of confidential materials; (2) the subsequent 
production in July 2013 of additional CONFIDENTIAL 
documents with bates numbers following the “missing” 
range, which should have indicated that the “missing” range 
had already been provided42; and (3) an October 2013 
interrogatory response that pointed to the Report but did not 
separately provide it. The Magistrate Judge concluded that 
counsel’s “lack of diligence” was to blame, given the 
“repeated opportunities and repeated clues” that “should have 
made a diligent attorney aware that something was missing”; 
that there was “no inquiry made . . . leads to the inescapable 
conclusion that the [April 2013 discovery] delay was in fact 
undue.”43  
Beginning with this last point, the record does not 
entirely support the Judge’s conclusion that Mullin’s attorney 
failed to make “inquiries.” To the contrary, she continued to 
ask the Attorney General’s office for relevant discovery; the 
                                              
41 JA 75. 
42 The April 2013 production of confidential materials had a 
Bates stamp range of 0001-0305, and the July 2013 
production of confidential material had a bates stamp range of 
0306-0918.  JA 887, 889 
43 JA 76. 
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record contains, for instance, a June 2013 email to the 
Attorney General where counsel complains that nothing 
relevant to her constitutional claims has been obtained from 
the State Defendants.44   
However, the central question is whether this is the 
sort of error by an attorney that can be excused. The 
Magistrate Judge indicated only that the error “should not be 
excused,”45 but, as explained below, something more is 
required.  
It is well established that “clients must be held 
accountable for the acts and omissions of their attorneys.”46 
In some circumstances, the Federal Rules allow for a court to 
relieve a party from adverse consequences arising out of 
“mistakes” or “excusable neglect,” which are often not the 
party’s but the attorney’s.47 In that context, we have 
conducted an “equitable” inquiry into the circumstances 
                                              
44 See JA 689. We note that, if the October 2013 interrogatory 
response referring to the Report is the point where a 
reasonable attorney should have been alerted to the missing 
discovery, it may have been appropriate to measure the delay 
from the time of reasonable discovery as opposed to the 
moment when the initial error occurred, depending on 
whether the error was in fact excusable. 
45 JA 76. 
46 Pioneer Inv. Servs. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 
U.S. 380, 396 (1993). 
47 See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) (allowing for relief from 
a final judgment on the basis of “mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect”); Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) 
(allowing for extension of time to appeal a notice of appeal 
when a party shows “excusable neglect or good cause”). 
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surrounding a party’s failure, balancing the factors of 
prejudice to the non-movant, the length of the delay, the 
reason for the delay, and the movant’s good faith.48   
While misunderstandings based on law or procedure 
rarely constitute excusable neglect, clerical errors have been 
found to do so, taking “into account whether the mistake was 
a single unintentional incident (as opposed to a pattern of 
deliberate dilatoriness and delay), and whether the attorney 
attempted to correct his action promptly after discovering the 
mistake,” as a “mistake could occur in any attorney’s office, 
no matter how well run.”49  An omission caused by 
carelessness, even if within counsel’s control, may therefore 
be excusable.50  
Rule 15, which governs amendment, does not mention 
excusable neglect or mistake, but this is in line with Rule 15’s 
general omission of any enumerated substantive or procedural 
limitation on amendment. And based on the similarities 
between the Rule 15 test and the excusable neglect analysis, 
mistakes, omissions, or neglect, should be evaluated with 
                                              
48 Ragguette v. Premier Wines & Spirits, 691 F.3d 315, 319, 
325 (3d Cir. 2012); see also Jennings v. Rivers, 394 F.3d 850, 
857 (10th Cir. 2005) (“An additional consideration is whether 
the . . . underlying claim is meritorious.”). This equitable test 
is not at all dissimilar from the Rule 15 amendment inquiry. 
As a result, some courts use the same analysis in determining 
whether a Rule 15 delay is undue. See, e.g., Gregory v. 
Mitchell, 634 F.2d 199, 203 (5th Cir. 1981). 
49 Jennings, 394 F.3d at 857 (internal quotation marks, 
alterations, and citations omitted). 
50 See Cheney v. Anchor Glass Container Corp., 71 F.3d 848, 
849–50 (11th Cir. 1996). 
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similar solicitude under Rule 15 as they would be under a 
Rule with an explicit “excusable neglect” condition.  
Here, even assuming the worst—that the delay ran at 
least ten months, and that Mullin’s attorney failed to realize 
the error despite clues to the contrary—we cannot say that the 
mistake here was per se inexcusable, rendering the delay 
“undue.” It was apparently the result of a single core error, 
the kind that could affect any law firm no matter how well 
run; there is no indication of any similar error elsewhere in 
the litigation; and the defense has not shown a pattern of 
similar faults or omissions.  
Neither the State Defendants nor the District Court 
questioned the attorney’s story that a clerical error led to the 
CONFIDENTIAL MULLIN materials being misplaced and 
misfiled. The record prior to March 2014 betrays no 
indication that Mullin or her attorney was aware of the Report 
or the related materials; as late as November 2013, Mullin’s 
attorney referred to the April 2013 disclosure as having 
produced nothing new or revelatory.51 Nor is there indication 
that Mullin could have obtained the CONFIDENTIAL 
MULLIN documents before she did. And when the mistake 
was discovered, counsel moved swiftly to bring it to the 
Court’s attention; the delay prior to the filing of the formal 
motion to amend was due to a scheduling order delaying 
                                              
51 See, e.g., Brief in Support of Motion for Reconsideration 3 
(“In April 2013 plaintiff received initial discovery from the 
State Defendants which was limited to the records already in 
plaintiff’s possession.”), ECF No. 155-2. 
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consideration of amendment until reconsideration had been 
granted or denied.52 
For the above reasons, we disagree with the Magistrate 
Judge that the delay attributable to the April 2013 discovery 
was “inescapabl[y]” undue.53 The record indicates that 
counsel followed up on documents that appeared to be 
missing; while counsel undoubtedly erred, with disastrous 
consequences for her client, the Magistrate Judge did not 
properly inquire as to whether the mistake was excusable in 
context, or from when the delay should have been measured. 
These considerations should be addressed on remand.   
2. Prejudice  
As set forth above, prejudice to the non-moving party 
has long been the “touchstone” for the denial of leave to 
amend.54 Here, the State Defendants had argued that the 
                                              
52 On the other hand, Mullin’s attorney does not help her 
cause by arguing on appeal, as she did before, that the 
Attorney General should have simply told her that she was 
missing something.  The Attorney General does not appear, as 
an ethical matter, to owe that enhanced degree of fairness to 
opposing counsel, so long as it does not undermine the candor 
required towards the tribunal. See N.J. R.P.C. 3.4; cf. also In 
re Jemsek Clinic, P.A., 850 F.3d 150, 159 (4th Cir. 2017) 
(“Under our adversarial system, litigants are not their 
opponents’ keepers. They have no duty to help their 
opponents maximize their recovery or prevent them from 
losing their claims.”).  
53 JA 76. 
54 See Heyl & Patterson Int’l, Inc. v. F. D. Rich Hous. of V.I., 
Inc., 663 F.2d 419, 425 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. 47 
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“numerous motions to amend” and other briefings had led 
them to expend significant resources on the litigation, and 
they further objected to Mullin’s “adding completely new 
defendants at this late stage of the litigation.”55 They asked 
the Magistrate Judge to “intercede by denying [amendment] 
and putting a stop to what seems like an endless cycle.”56  
The Magistrate Judge largely agreed with this line of 
argument. In a short discussion on prejudice, the Judge found 
that “[t]he current defendants, as well as those who have 
already been dismissed, have spent significant resources on 
this litigation, and they would essentially be forced back to 
square one.” With regard to the proposed defendants, there 
was “nothing beyond speculation to support the notion that . . 
. there would not be prejudice to them in defending on the 
merits.”57 In the summary section, the Judge wrote that 
“allowing the amendment at this point of the litigation, after 
so much motion practice, would only cause further delay, to 
the prejudice of the parties.”58  
At the outset, the arguments against amendment 
advanced here and by the State Defendants on appeal do not 
connect prejudice to the additional delay caused by the 
mistake of Mullin’s attorney. Rather, these claims of 
prejudice would have applied with near-equal force had 
Mullin timely moved to amend immediately upon obtaining 
the April 2013 disclosures. Accordingly, we view the “delay” 
                                                                                                     
Bottles, More or Less, Jenasol RJ Formula “60”, 320 F.2d 
564, 573 (3d Cir. 1963). 
55 JA 76. 
56 JA 20.  
57 JA 77. 
58 JA 78. 
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complained of here as referring to the pendency of the 
litigation as a whole and not to the delay in seeking to amend 
once the CONFIDENTIAL MULLIN documents were 
disclosed.  
Thus framed, we again disagree with the Magistrate 
Judge’s analysis.  Mullin appears to be largely without fault 
for the years that passed before she obtained the 
CONFIDENTIAL MULLIN documents which radically 
altered her understanding of the night Robert took his own 
life. The State Defendants have not argued that she could 
have obtained the Report earlier, or that there was a hint of 
the proposed new defendants—and especially Officer X—in 
any of the discovery documents prior.  While the State 
Defendants are within their rights to comply only with those 
discovery obligations actually due under law, they cannot 
persuasively rely on resulting delay as a source of prejudice.59  
It was also not improper for Mullin to replead 
dismissed defendants and claims in her proposed amended 
complaint. At the time she filed her proposed TAC, Mullin 
may not have decided whether she intended to pursue the 
already dismissed claims and parties on appeal, and including 
them in the proposed TAC preserved that right. Because an 
amended complaint supersedes the original, “parties 
                                              
59 Cf. Joseph v. Elan Motorsports Techs. Racing Corp., 638 
F.3d 555, 560 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Prejudice manufactured by a 
defendant is not a ground for refusing relation back.”).  The 
multiple rounds of motions practice are also of uncertain 
relevance to prejudice. Had Mullin sought leave to amend at 
the moment when she obtained the April 2013 disclosures, 
she would have interrupted pending Rule 12 motions then, 
too.  
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voluntarily dropped from an amended complaint do not 
remain in the case.”60 Claims omitted from an amended 
complaint remain in the case only if previously dismissed on 
“legal grounds, rather than due to a lack of factual 
specificity.”61 Dropping parties and dropping claims can 
therefore lead to abandonment later in the case and on appeal. 
Thus, to the extent that the Magistrate Judge counted this 
against Mullin with regard to prejudice or judicial economy, 
it was error to do so; since the abandonment rule applies only 
to claims or parties “voluntarily” dropped, allowing 
amendment but conditioning it on omission of previously 
dismissed claims or parties does not trigger the rule, and is 
the preferred way to resolve the problem.   
It is thus not correct to say that granting leave to 
amend would put the defendants back at square one or 
perpetuate an infinite cycle. The Magistrate Judge would have 
been entitled to rely on the District Court’s earlier dismissal 
opinion in determining whether previously dismissed 
defendants should remain in the case, and could have set 
further conditions on amendment, discovery, and so on. The 
“cycle” of motions practice interrupted by amendment 
requests based on new evidence remains a risk only for as 
long as discovery remains open.62 And because Mullin did 
not appeal the dismissal of any defendants other than Dimler, 
or the subsequent grant of summary judgment for the intake 
                                              
60 Palakovic, 854 F.3d at 221 n.13. 
61 Id. at 221. 
62 See Miller v. Admin. Office of the Courts, 448 F.3d 887, 
898–99 (6th Cir. 2006) (explaining that the close of discovery 
indicates prejudice).  
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nurse, any challenges relating to those decisions have now 
been abandoned.63  
In sum, while the defendants have undoubtedly 
expended resources over the course of the litigation, and 
would have to expend additional effort were amendment 
allowed, their case for prejudice is thin. A defendant that 
possesses an explosive document unknown to the plaintiff 
may use the legitimate litigation strategies at hand to delay 
disclosure of that document until absolutely necessary, but 
that delay cannot thereafter form that defendant’s argument 
for prejudice if it leads to a belated request to amend. Because 
the State Defendants did not persuasively articulate a theory 
of prejudice, and because the Magistrate Judge’s discussion 
relied on factors that appear to have been allowable litigation 
choices on Mullin’s behalf, we will vacate for reconsideration 
of this factor. 
3. Judicial Economy 
Judicial economy is an equitable consideration that can 
be considered in deciding whether amendment should be 
allowed. It is uncommonly a factor that stands entirely alone, 
separate and apart from prejudice and factors relevant to 
                                              
63 See Beazer E., Inc. v. Mead Corp., 525 F.3d 255, 263 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (collecting cases); Cty. of Suffolk v. Stone & 
Webster Eng’g Corp., 106 F.3d 1112, 1117 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(when “a decision made at a previous stage of litigation” was 
not “challenged in the ensuing appeal . . . [,] the parties are 
deemed to have waived the right to challenge that decision”). 
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whether a delay was “undue.”64 Considerations include 
judicial efficiency and effective case management.65  
The Magistrate Judge appeared to consider judicial 
economy by discussing the work already done by the Court: 
the “almost four years” that had passed since its filing, at least 
“eight conferences” that had been held with the parties, and 
the extensive motions practice that included “at least four 
motions to dismiss.”66 The Magistrate Judge also referred to 
the District Court’s work “in preparing a 40-page opinion, 
which would be rendered moot if the amendment were 
allowed to proceed.”67  
While the litigation had doubtlessly been frustrating, 
and Mullin’s apparent minimization of the many stumbles 
throughout is discouraging, the Magistrate Judge’s focus on 
the past inappropriately constrains the scope of the judicial 
economy inquiry. The difficulty in managing the litigation 
thus far is certainly salient, but simply tallying up the number 
of motions, conferences (of any type), and opinions sheds 
little light on whether future management of the case would 
encounter similar difficulties. The length of the District 
Court’s opinion on dismissal, and the effort behind it, are also 
of uncertain weight, especially in light of this Circuit’s 
                                              
64 See, e.g., Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 952 F.2d 841, 846–47 
(5th Cir. 1992) (affirming denial of leave to amend because 
party’s delay imposed burdens both on the defendants and on 
the court). 
65 See Jebaco, Inc. v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 587 F.3d 314, 
322 (5th Cir. 2009). 
66 JA 77. 
67 JA 77. 
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default presumption in favor of amendment in civil rights 
cases.  
As cast in this case, “judicial economy” sounds almost 
like a sanction for prior perceived errors.  As presented, it 
does not currently support the Magistrate Judge’s decision to 
deny leave to amend.  
4. Relation Back and 
Timeliness 
 The Magistrate Judge summarily addressed, and the 
parties have briefed before us, the doctrine of “Relation 
Back.”  This refers to the operation of Rule 15(c), which 
allows certain new claims and new parties added in an 
amended complaint to “relate back” to the date of filing of the 
original complaint for statute of limitations purposes if certain 
conditions are met.68  While courts are permitted to combine 
the question of whether amendment should be granted with 
the issue of whether the proposed amendment relates back,69 
the two inquiries are analytically distinct; relation back is a 
test of the legal viability of the proposed amendment, and not 
a discretionary factor weighing in favor of or against 
amendment.70 Thus, in certain cases, the “better approach” is 
to treat leave to amend and relation back/timeliness 
separately, determining first whether amendment should be 
allowed under the discretionary factors, and only then passing 
                                              
68 See Singletary v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 266 F.3d 186, 193 (3d 
Cir. 2001). 
69 See, e.g., Maersk, 434 F.3d at 204. 
70 See Garvin v. City of Phila., 354 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 
2003). 
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on whether the complaint relates back or is otherwise 
timely.71 
On this record, we conclude that determining whether 
the complaint “relates back” is unnecessary, at least with 
regard to Mullin’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 vulnerability-to-suicide 
constitutional claims brought against Officer X.  The 
allegations against Officer X would be timely on their face. 
The accrual date of a § 1983 claim is determined under 
federal law.72  Generally, a constitutional claim under § 1983 
accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the 
injury upon which the action is based.73  A vulnerability-to-
suicide claim, which is simply a more specific articulation of 
the Eighth Amendment rule that prison officials must not be 
deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs, 
requires showing (1) the existence of a particular 
vulnerability to suicide, (2) that a prison official knew or 
should have known of the individual’s particularly 
vulnerability, and (3) that the official acted with reckless or 
deliberate indifference to the particular vulnerability.74  The 
accrual of the claim is not tied solely to the prisoner’s suicide 
                                              
71 Joseph v. Elan Motorsports Techs. Racing Corp., 638 F.3d 
555, 558–59 (7th Cir. 2011); see also Glover v. FDIC, 698 
F.3d 139, 144–48 (3d Cir. 2012) (on dismissal posture, 
addressing relation back and timeliness separately). 
72 Montanez v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 773 F.3d 472, 480 
(3d Cir. 2014). 
73 Id. 
74 Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 222, 223–24 (3d Cir. 
2017). 
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itself, but also to the unconstitutional act by the prison official 
that gives rise to the claim.75 
Here, the actual nature of the claim against Officer X 
was unknown to Mullin until the receipt, by counsel, of the 
April 2013 disclosures.  Mullin’s claim against the prior State 
Defendants, premised on their alleged failure to be put on 
notice of Robert’s intake answers and transfer materials, 
stemmed from a different asserted injury.  Officer X, by 
contrast, is alleged to have specifically known of Robert’s 
need for mental-health intervention and to have disregarded 
it.  Mullin would not have been put on notice of the elements 
comprising this separate injury by the pre-April 2013 
disclosures, and the fact of Robert’s death itself did not 
otherwise cause the limitations period to start running.  As 
discussed above, Mullin’s investigative diligence has not 
been called into question.  Thus, either innately or through the 
application of the discovery rule,76 the facts of this case show 
                                              
75 Cf. Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8 (1981) (per 
curiam) (explaining that the date of the act, not the date of 
consequences, controls); Heard v. Sheahan, 253 F.3d 316, 
318 (7th Cir. 2001) (Posner, J.).  
76 See United States v. Norwood, 602 F.3d 830, 837 (7th Cir. 
2010) (“The discovery rule starts the statute of limitations 
running only when the plaintiff learns that he’s been injured, 
and by whom.”).  We need not definitively determine whether 
the timeliness of Mullin’s proposed amended complaint is 
due to deferred accrual, deferred commencement of the 
limitations period, or tolling. See William A. Graham Co. v. 
Haughey, 646 F.3d 138, 147–50 (3d Cir. 2011) (discussing 
imprecision between accrual and the running of the 
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that Mullin could not have learned of the particular nature of 
this serious disregard of Robert’s mental state—or who was at 
fault—until she had obtained the Report or its equivalent.  
Mullin’s attempt to amend therefore fell well within the 
applicable two-year limitations period if measured from the 
April 2013 disclosure date.77 
C. Summary 
For the above reasons, we conclude that the Magistrate 
Judge’s exercise of discretion was not within the boundaries 
contemplated by Rule 15 or the Foman factors, in light of the 
liberal pleading regime established by the Federal Rules. We 
remand for the Magistrate Judge or District Court to reassess 
the propriety of amendment under the proper framework. The 
Court may also wish to weigh whether the claims advanced 
by Mullin on the basis of the new discovery are meritorious in 
deciding whether amendment is warranted.78 If the Court 
nonetheless decides that the delay was undue or that the 
defendants have articulated past or potential future prejudice, 
the Court may wish to consider whether attaching conditions 
to amendment, or limiting amendment to certain claims and 
parties, suffices to mitigate those concerns.  Finally, while we 
have determined that the § 1983 claims against Officer X 
would be timely if allowed to proceed, the District Court may 
consider whether Rule 15 relation back—including the 
                                                                                                     
limitations period, especially with regard to the discovery 
rule).  
77 Dique, 603 F.3d at 185. 
78 See Jennings, 394 F.3d at 857. 
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application of the New Jersey fictitious party rule79—or other 
limitations doctrines suffice to render timely other claims 
against other proposed parties.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
  
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part, 
vacate in part, and remand.   
                                              
79 See DeRienzo v. Harvard Indus., 357 F.3d 348, 353–54 (3d 
Cir. 2004) (addressing N.J. Ct. R. 4:25-4).  
